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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance (or Noncompliance) with International Obligations

The timeline information below was found throughout congress.gov We just found it and put it on order to make sense of how the program worked, or did not work.
Starting in July 2019, the IAEA verified that some of Iran's nuclear activities were exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits; Iran has since increased the number of activities that violate JCOPA restrictions. According to IAEA reports, Iran's number of installed centrifuges, enriched uranium stockpile, enriched uranium u-235 concentration, and number of enrichment locations exceeded JCPOA-mandated limits. Tehran is also conducting JCPOA-prohibited research and development activities, as well as centrifuge installation.
Beginning in November 2019, IAEA reports have detailed what Director General Rafael Grossi had described as possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities in Iran. Specifically, IAEA inspectors have detected anthropogenic uranium particles at three undeclared Iranian locations.
The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the "E3," stated on January 14, 2020, that Iran is not meeting its JCPOA commitments and announced that the three governments were referring the matter to the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism (DRM).
In a March 4, 2020, press interview, Grossi explained that the fact that we found traces (of uranium) is very important. That means there is the possibility of nuclear activities and material that are not under international supervision and about which we know not the origin or the intent. A June 2020 report from Director General Grossi explained that Tehran's inadequate cooperation with the IAEA was adversely affecting the Agency's ability to clarify and resolve the questions raised by the IAEA's findings.
On July 3, 2020, EU High Representative Borrell received a letter from Iran's Foreign Minister referring Iran's concerns regarding E3 JCPOA implementation to the joint commission. But a November 2020 E3 statement explains that those governments do not accept the argument that Iran is entitled to reduce compliance with the JCPOA.
A February 2021 report from IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi states that the IAEA had continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions which apply to certain nuclear weapons-related activities and are described in Section T of the JCPOA. A May 31, 2025, report from Grossi, however, states that the agency has not been able to undertake these verification and monitoring activities since his February 2021 report. But, Iran informed the IAEA in a February 15, 2021, letter that the government, as of February 23, would stop implementing some of the JCPOA voluntary transparency measures described above, including implementation of the Additional Protocol.
In late August 2021, the agency requested that Iran provide access to all relevant locations in Iran in order to service the equipment and replace the storage media. The IAEA also requested that Tehran permit agency inspectors to verify the status of four surveillance cameras that Iran had removed from its TESA Karaj complex centrifuge component manufacturing workshop. Iranian officials have explained that the government removed the cameras following a June 23, 2021, "terrorist attack in which ... the agency's equipment was destroyed and damaged."
Iran did not fully comply with this agreement, according to the IAEA. Iran permitted agency inspectors from September 20-22, 2021, to service the identified Agency monitoring and surveillance equipment and to replace storage media, at all necessary locations in Iran, according to a November 17, 2021, report from Grossi, which adds that Iran denied the inspectors access to the Karaj workshop.
A March 5, 2022, joint statement detailing a mutual agreement to accelerate and strengthen mutual cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of the outstanding issues and specifying a series of actions ... upon completion of which Grossi intended to report his conclusion in time for the IAEA Board of Governors June 2022 meeting. But according to a May 2022 report from Director General Grossi, the relevant safeguards issues remained outstanding.
A March 4, 2023, report from Grossi notes that by the end of February 2023 no progress had been made toward resolving any of the outstanding safeguard's issues. According to an IAEA-AEOI joint statement issued the same day, Iran expressed its readiness to continue its cooperation and provide further information and access to address the outstanding safeguards issues concerning the above-described locations.
Iran subsequently provided a possible explanation for the presence of nuclear material at one of the three undeclared locations, Grossi reported on May 31, 2023, adding that the matter is no longer outstanding. However the safeguards issues concerning the other two sites remain outstanding. A September 14, 2023, letter to the IAEA from Tehran asserted that the government "has exhausted all its efforts so as to discover the origin of the uranium particles".
A September 13, 2023, E3 statement explains that, since invoking the DRM, the governments have strived in good faith to resolve the issues arising from Iran's non-compliance both via the DRM and "beyond." The E3 will continue consultations, alongside international partners, on how best to address increasing doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, the statement adds.
On June 5, 2024, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran to take a number of actions, such as complying with the November 2022 board resolution and implementing the March 2023 joint statement. The board warned that Iran's failure to cooperate with the agency's investigation of the outstanding safeguards issues could necessitate the production by Grossi of a comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in Iran.
A November 27, 2024, news report stated that, according to Eslami, Iran had begun to feed gaseous uranium hexafluoride into "several thousand advanced centrifuges." Grossi produced the board-ordered report on May 31, 2025.
A December 6, 2024, E3 letter to the UN Security Council similarly notes that those governments have "striven in good faith to resolve the issues arising from Iran's non-compliance through" the DRM and reiterates the E3's "determination to use all diplomatic tools to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using" the "snapback" mechanism to reimpose sanctions.
More recently, the E3 wrote in a June 9 letter to the Security Council that the governments "will pursue all diplomatic options to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Absent a satisfying deal, the E3 will consider triggering the "snapback" mechanism to address threats to international peace and security arising from Iran's nuclear programme." The E3 reiterated this stance in July 2025.
Following June 2025 Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran, which included strikes on some Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran adopted a law that suspended the government's cooperation with the IAEA.15 Agency inspectors reportedly withdrew from Iran in early July.16 Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei stated on August 4 that there were no IAEA inspectors in the country.
As this is this is just some of the breeches that occurred during the JCPOA. How in this MAD WORLD is this a model for diplomatic risk-reduction. At some point people need to educate themselves and stop listening to what the media portrays as facts. They need to do better fact checking. When they repeatedly show a politician say the same false remarks and lies over and over... But then again, they have guests on their panel who are going to twist and skew everything their oposite party has accomplished. That is a whole story in iself. Nobody has done anything to stop the Iranian non-sense, they just let it go on since 1979. It is about time and the end is near. You watch!
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